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EXPERIMENTAL EXCLUSIONS: ARE INSURANCE
COMPANIES REALLY PROTECTED?
With the advent of new high-technology medical
procedures,' insurance companies are finding themselves in the
unenviable position of deciding which medical procedures they will
cover and which procedures will fall outside the coverage of their
policies. Most insurance policies contain express exclusions for
"experimental" or "investigative" treatments.2 These exclusions are
necessary because insurers wish to avoid paying for unproven,
fraudulent, or useless treatments so as to sustain their ability to
provide insurance coverage at a reasonable price. Experimental
exclusions, in particular, are useful in achieving these objectives
because some physicians tend to prescribe new treatments that have
yet to be accepted by a consensus of the medical community? The
recent trend among both state and federal courts, however, is to
require insurance companies to provide policy holders with funds to
pay for treatments not generally accepted by the medical community.
These experimental treatments fall under the exclusionary language
present in most policies.4 The courts are concededly placed in
' See, e.g., Joe Clements, Insurance Casts a Shadow on Medical Advances, 10 BOSToN
Bus. J. No. 22, July 23, 1990, at 9 (Treatments for man's most debilitating illnesses
have emerged with increasing frequency; "[a]s vice president for research
administration at New England Medical Center, Frank Stout witnesses the creation
of cutting-edge treatments for mankind's most troubling illnesses. With new drugs
and procedures constantly being developed, he reports promising advancements
in fighting diseases such as cancer and acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS).").

2 See, e.g., AIDS Won't Wait; Science is Hurryingto Combat the Virulent New Virus;

Health Insurers Should Too, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Aug. 4, 1990, at 18.
"Bradley's policy-like most people's-didnot cover experimental procedures." Id. (emphasis
added); see also Julia F. Costich, Note, Denial of Coveragefor "Experimental" Medical
Procedures: The Problem of De Novo Review Under ERISA, 79 KY. L.J. 801, 809 (1991).
' See Jennifer Belk, Note, Undefined Experimental Treatment Exclusions in Health
Insurance Contracts, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809, 810 (1991).
" "[A]ffecting judges' decisions is a growing body of state and federal decisions
ordering insurance companies to pay for treatments that, while likely beneficial to
the patient, lack the kind of time-tested proof that insurance companies have
traditionally required." Jim Puzzanghera, AIDS Ruling and the Courts; Bradley Case
Verdict Helps Patients Battle Insurers, NEWSDAY (Nassau & Suffolk ed.), Aug. 13,
1990, at 7 [hereinafter Puzzanghera, AIDS Ruling].
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extremely difficult situations; their decisions granting terminally ill
patients a final chance for survival are correctly viewed as
compassionate. However, courts have been forcing insurance
companies to fund experimental treatments and have not been
considering the future beneficiaries who will require funds for
medically proven treatments. Also, there is great danger in providing
treatments that are not supported by a consensus of the medical
community;
[t]o illustrate the dangers of medicine lacking
underpinnings of scientific proof, Henderson [,who
heads the Breast Evaluation Center at the Dana
Farber Cancer Institute,] points to the Halsted radical
mastectomy [, which is a procedure for the treatment
of breast cancer that involves removing most of the
breast along with surrounding tissue]. In that
operation surgeons removed not only the breast but
a large part of the chest muscle and all of the lymph
nodes. Surgeons routinely carried out the Halsted
operation from early in the century until the late
1960s, when some discovered that excising only the
breast or even only the lump could be just as
effective.
"Because the preliminary data were
promising... approximately 5 million women got a
relatively mutilating form of surgery before we found
out that it wasn't much better than the conventional
form of treatment .... .,5
Among the newest treatments now being covered by insurance
companies is high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone-marrow
transplant ("HDCT-ABMT"). Although many insurance companies
cover HDCT-ABMT for a number of diseases, 6 there are many
diseases for which HDCT-ABMT is still in its experimental stages.
s Robert Bazell, Topic of Cancer; Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant Policy, 203
THE NEW REPUBLIC 9 (Dec. 31, 1990) (quoting Harv. Med. School's Craig

Henderson.).
6 See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, Insurer to Finance Test of a Treatment For Breast
Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at B8 ("Most Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans pay
for such treatment [HDCT-ABMT] for patients with cancers such as Hodgkin's
disease, some types of lymphoma and leukemia, and neuroblastoma, a childhood
cancer.").
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For example, most insurance companies will not fund HDCT-ABMT
for the treatment of breast cancer.7 In addition to HDCT-ABMT
being used to combat various types of cancer,' it has recently been
9
used as a treatment for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome.
HDCT-ABMT is a procedure by which a patient's bonemarrow is extracted, frozen, and stored ° while the patient receives
large, near lethal doses of chemotherapy." In some cases, the
chemotherapy is administered in excess of one-thousand times the
standard dose. 2 Certain dangers exist when chemotherapeutic
agents are used excessively; "[t]hese therapies may destroy cancer
cells, but at the same time, they may completely destroy normal bone
marrow, which produces 'normal cells.""' 3 After the chemotherapy
is completed, the patient's stored bone marrow is returned to the
patient's body to replace the damaged bone marrow and thereby to
7 Id; see also Erik Eckholm, Patientsand Insurers Clash On Therapy's Outer Limits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1991, at Al ("Recently, some insurers have begun writing
policies that specifically exclude coverage of bone marrow transplants for breast
cancer ....
We have no evidence as of yet that any patient will be cured by this
therapy who would not have been cured by more conventional treatment.").
' Elisabeth Rosenthal, Patient'sMarrow Emerges as Key Cancer Tool, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1990, at C8. As the author explained,
[alutologous transplant has become the treatment of choice for
certain tumors of the immune system, or lymphomas, and a few
tumors of the blood, or leukemias, with cure rates of over 50
percent. Researchers hope that the technique might eventually
help save many patients with widespread breast cancer, ovarian
cancer and myeloma as well .... [Tihe autologous transplants
theoretically can be applied to any tumor for which more
chemotherapy is considered better

Id.
9 See, e.g., Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup.
Ct. 1990). Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome [hereinafter AIDS] is a disease
caused by a virus known as Human Immunodeficiency Virus [hereinafter HIV]. See
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY

37-38 (25th ed. 1990).

See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 8, at C1.
u Chemotherapy is defined as "the use of chemical agents on the treatment or
0

control of disease." WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 114 (1986).
12Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586,588 (E.D. Va. 1990).
13 Chih W. Chang & Karen Bertch, Basic Concepts and Recent Advances in
Immunology, 132 DRUG TOPICS No. 15 at 70.
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rescue the patient."4 A patient who undergoes HDCT-ABMT is
hospitalized, often in intensive care, for approximately ten days
during the treatment and requires full-time attention.' s The entire
procedure costs approximately $100,000, and most providers of the
treatment require prepayment or at least a substantial deposit. 6
Recently, there has been much litigation as to whether HDCTABMT is a procedure available to beneficiaries of insurance policies
or whether the procedure falls within the exclusionary language
present in most private insurance policies, employee welfare plans
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 17 and under the federal Medicare provisions of the Social
Security Act. 8 Courts have begun to distinguish between the
particular diseases that warrant the use of HDCT-ABMT as a proper
treatment and those diseases for which the application of HDCTABMT would be experimental. 9 These cases may well be beyond
the scope of the courts' ability to analyze the issues in a competent
manner. Judges are neither scientists nor doctors, thus they are
unable to render objective medical conclusions,
[i]n the case of experimental vs. established
treatments, how are courts able to marshal the
expertise that is the traditional province of doctors
and academics? Experts who testify in court typically
work for one side or the other - hired guns in a
high-stakes adversarial game. How can judges avail
themselves of the impartial scientific knowledge
' Andrew Pollack, Two Drugs in a New Class Pass a Major F.D.A. Hurdle, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1990, at 33; see also Eckholm, supra note 7, at A22 ("For weeks, until

the reinjected marrow begins producing new blood cells, assuming it does, the
patient lives without much of an immune system, susceptible to vicious fungal,
bacterial and viral infections.").
Chang & Bertch, supra note 13, at 70.
C5
16Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 588.
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)
'8
"

[hereinafter ERISAJ.

1 395

(y) (1988).
42 U.S.C. §
See, e.g., Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup.

Ct. 1990); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990);
Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.J., No. 90-597, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376,

(D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990); see also Eckholm, supra note 7, at Al ("Whether insurers
should pay for marrow transplants has already become tinder for bitter lawsuits,
poignant talk shows and an emerging political movement of breast cancer
patients.").
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needed to declare an expensive procedure safe and
effective? How will the courts know when an order
to pay for a procedure may be a sentence to a
punishingly shortened life, or one accompanied by
serious medical complications?"
This Note will examine several opinions that have concluded
that HDCT-ABMT is a proper treatment notwithstanding the fact that
the medical community may not have generally accepted the
treatment for the particular malady being analyzed by the court.2'
This Note will focus on judicial interpretations of the experimental
exclusions present in privately funded medical insurance policies, in
employee welfare plans provided by employers, and also under the
federal Medicare program. The courts have effectively stricken the
exclusionary clauses in most policies, unfairly rewriting the contract
entered into by the parties. The courts are rewriting policies because
"[i]n their admirable belief that justice should always be tempered by
compassion, some jurists occasionally confuse the two, dispensing
compassion instead of justice."22
I. HDCT-ABMT UNDER THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECuRrY AcT OF 197423

A. Standard of Review
ERISA' 4 covers medical. insurance plans that are provided
2 Franklin M. Zweig, Health Care Goes to Court; Judges Need Access to Impartial
Medical Expertise, WASH. POST, July 17, 1990, at Z6.
' Id. ("But in recent years a disturbing trend seems to have emerged: using the

decisive powers of the courts to determine what constitutes safe and effective
treatment. Furthermore, judges are ordering insurance companies to pay for certain
kinds of medical treatment, some of which are experimental."); see also Bazell, supra
note 5, at 9 ("The woman believes she will die without the treatment [HDCTABMT], and almost never will she encounter a judge who will rule that she can't
have it."). It is also difficult to categorize HDCT-ABMr as a conventional treatment
"[b]ecause ABMTs are relatively new, no patient yet has survived five years
without recurrence-the time generally accepted as a cancer cure." Id.
' See generally B.D. Colen, Payingfor All of the Tom Bradleys, NEWSDAY (Nassau
& Suffolk ed.), Aug. 7, 1990, at 13.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
24 Id.
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by employers to employees and their dependents.' ERISA plans
have named plan administrators who may be given the authority to
administer the terms of the plan.26 The plan administrator also acts
as a fiduciary to the beneficiaries.'
As a fiduciary, the plan
administrator must act "for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan."2' Where a plan
administrator denies funds for a particular treatment, the plan
administrator must act as a fiduciary to the party who requests the
funds as well as a fiduciary to the other participants, for whom the
administrator must limit imprudent expenditures from the plan. The
plan administrator is thus placed in an inherent conflict of interest
each time a decision must be made regarding the status of a medical
treatment. Cumulatively, increased benefit outlays negatively affect
other beneficiaries of the plan. The fiduciary duties mandated by
ERISA are thus
compromised when the plan pays for experimental
29
procedures.

ERISA allows for coverage denials to be challenged by a
2

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1988).

See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (1988).
27See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1988). The statute states that:

a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets, ... or (iii) he
has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in
the administration of such plan. Such term includes any person
designated under section 1105(c)(1)(B) ....

In relevant part, 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1) & (3) provide that:
(1) [tlhe instrument under which a plan is maintained may
expressly provide for procedures (A) for allocating fiduciary
responsibilities (other than trustee responsibilities) among named
fiduciaries, and (B) for named fiduciaries to designate persons
other than named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary
responsibilities (other than trustee responsibilities) under the
plan.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term "trustee
responsibility" means any responsibility provided in the plan's
trust instrument (if any) to manage or control the assets of the
plan ....
2 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
' See id.
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beneficiary in a civil proceeding."° If a legal remedy, such as a
recovery of benefits, is sought, suit may be filed in either state or
federal district court.31 When a plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy,
such as an injunction to prevent a plan from denying coverage, the
federal district courts of the United States have exclusive
jurisdiction.32
Under ERISA, a plan administrator's denial of benefits to a
beneficiary of a plan may be reviewed by a court either de novo or
under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review.'
The
standard of review used in a specific situation is often outcome
determinative.' If a reviewing court decides that it will analyze de
novo a plan administrator's decision to deny benefits, the court will
not pay deference to the administrator's decision; instead the court
will review the benefit denial anew and examine evidence regarding
the level of medical acceptance a particular treatment has attained.3 s
Thus, when a court is using a de novo standard of review, it will
more readily find that the denial of benefits was improper than it
would under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard.' When a court
uses the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the court will defer to the
plan administrator and not overturn the denial of benefits unless the
denial was unreasonable or constituted an abuse of discretion.37
The court's deference to a plan administrator's denial of benefits is
- See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988) ("A civil action may be brought by a participant
or beneficiary to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan, to enforce
his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits
under the terms of the plan ....
").
31See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1988) ("State courts of competent jurisdiction and
district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions
under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this section" [in actions to recover benefits].).

32 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
' See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989)("[A] denial
of benefits challenged... is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.").
' See, e.g., Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 595 n.20
(E.D. Va. 1990); see also DeNobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1188 (4th Cir. 1989)
("We have given the standard of review issue such considerable attention for the
simple reason that, were we to consider de novo review appropriate, we might well

hold for the retirees.").
' See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113.
36

'7

id.

Id. at 110-11.
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based on the rationale that the trustees of the plan have superior
expertise in applying and interpreting the terms of the plan and the
ability to balance the interests of the plan's participants and
beneficiaries.' An administrator's or plan fiduciary's decision to
deny benefits under an ERISA plan will be subject to an arbitraryand-capricious standard of review when "[a] trustee [is] given power
to construe disputed or doubtful terms, and in such circumstances
the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable."39
When trustees are acting within the scope of their authority pursuant
to "a discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they
act,"' the court will defer to their decision if reasonable."'
If the court finds that an ERISA plan is devoid of language
that authorizes the plan administrator to determine whether a
particular benefit falls under the coverage of the plan, the court will
review the claim "as it would any other claim."' The court seeks
to determine the interpretation of the plan that will further the
intentions of all parties to the contract. In doing so, the court may
look to extrinsic evidence and evidence that was not relied upon by
the plan in denying coverage.'
The court therefore, inevitably
relies on the testimony of medical experts in reaching its decision."
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "a denial of benefits
...

is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit

' Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489
U.S. 101 (1989).
3' Firestone,489 U.S. at 111 (citation omitted).
Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724-25 (1875).
"See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111 ("A trustee may be given power to construe
disputed or doubtful terms, and in such circumstances the trustee's interpretation
will not be disputed if reasonable.").
42 Id. at 112-13. The Firestone Court stated that,
[t]he trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the
judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the
enactment of ERISA. Actions challenging an employer's denial
of benefits before enactment of ERISA were governed by
principles of contract law. If the plan did not give the employer
or administrator discretionary or final authority to construe
uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it

would any other contract claim -by looking to the terms of the
plan and other manifestations of the parties' intent.
Id. Thus, the standard of review that the court uses will often determine whether
the plan administrator's decision will be reversed.
4Id.
44Id.
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plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan."'5 Thus, when a court is reviewing an administrator's denial
of funds to a beneficiary of an ERISA plan, it must first look to the
language of the plan document. The court must then decide whether
the denial of benefits under the exclusionary provision constituted a
power that was expressly given to the plan administrator in the plan
document. Finally, the court decides which procedures will be
covered and which procedures fall under the exclusionary language
of the plan.'
A court that reviews the terms of the plan will usually find
that the plan contains gaps and is without explicit language
authorizing the plan administrator to determine which treatments are
medically necessary and which ones are experimental or
investigative.47 If the meaning of the language of the plan is clear,
the analysis will be over.' However, "[iln the context of modem
medicine, the term experimental seems clearly ambiguous on its
face.n49
Most often, a court will resolve the "experimental"
ambiguity by referring to a plan's structure and to the testimony of
experts.5° Thus, a trial that determines the status of a particular
treatment, either as experimental or as generally accepted by the
medical community as a treatment for a certain disorder, will often
ISld.
See Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., 874 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1989). The
Eighth Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Bruch and stated

that, "Bruch indicates that the threshold issue in an analysis of benefit
determinations by fiduciaries or plan administrators under ERISA is whether the
fiduciary or plan administrator had discretionary power to construe certain terms
in the benefit plan." Id. (citing Firestone,489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989)); see also Pirozzi v.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("Analysis
properly begins with the Plan's terms.").
"See, e.g., Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 589.
48 Id.

' Johnson v. District Two Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n Marine Officers
Medical Plan, 857 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 587 (1990); see
also Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 589 ("Analysis properly begins with the Plan's terms.
... With this review as its lens, the court now focuses on the meaning of the
experimental treatment exclusion as it applies to HDCT-ABMT for plaintiff.").
o See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wis., 846 F.2d 416, 420-24 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
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Insurance companies will
turn into a "battle of the experts."'
usually refer to objective criteria listed in their plan in determining
whether a particular treatment is experimental. 2
B. Recent Cases
In Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Jersey,' the District
Court for the District of New Jersey decided a coverage issue
concerning the payment of benefits for HDCT-ABMT treatment of
' See, e.g., Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 591, 592 n.12. "Against Dr. Colley's testimony
must be weighed the directly contrary testimony of two Board-certified oncologists
...."Id. at 591; Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 132 (D.N.J.
1989). As the court explained, "[flour very talented expert witnesses in the present
case were in disagreement." Id. at 138; see also Bazell, supra note 5, at 9. Courts are
often faced with conflicting testimony,
[i]n the typical case, one or more doctors testify that though the
procedure may not work, it stands as the only hope for the
woman to survive longer than a few more years. On the other
side, doctors paid by the insurers say there is no proof that the
treatment will do the woman any good, and that it may kill her
faster than the cancer.
Id. Judges often decide benefit denial cases for the beneficiary because they realize
that affirming the plan administrator's decision will likely result in the beneficiary's
death.
52 For example, Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia had the following criteria
in its plan:
(1) Is the drug or device approved by the Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) to market for the particular indication or
application in question?
(2) Is there sufficient information in the peer-reviewed medical
and scientific literature to enable Blue Cross to make conclusions
about the drug's, device's, or procedure's safety and efficacy?
(3) Does the available scientific evidence demonstrate a net
beneficial effect on health outcomes?
(4) Is the drug, device or procedure as safe and efficacious as
existing diagnostic or therapeutic alternatives?
(5) Can the drug, device or procedure reasonably be expected to
satisfy 3 and 4 when applied outside the research setting?
[A]ny drug, device or treatment that fails to meet any one of the
five criteria is excluded from coverage by virtue of the
experimental procedure exclusion.
Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 590-91.
' Robo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.J., No. 90-597,1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376
(D.N.J. March 22, 1990).
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pre-pubescent Wilms' tumor' Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, who
decided Rollo, stated the issue to be "whether eight year old Tishna
Rolo could live or whether she must die."' The court stated "that
Blue Cross/Blue Shield would have to defend their decision denying
coverage and, if they successfully did so, this child would most likely
die, a victory which would give even the victor little satisfaction."'
Judge Barry found that HDCT-ABMT was Tishna Robl's best chance
for survival and that "Tishna will have at least at [sic] 50% chance of
being a long-term survivor and the chances are 85-90% that she will
leave the University of Nebraska Medical Center alive and well
"57

Because the Blue Cross/Blue Shield policy was an ERISA
plan and had a named administrator who was authorized to make
the ultimate decision concerning the experimental status of certain
treatments, Blue Cross/Blue Shield argued in Rollo that its decision
to deny payment must be reviewed under an arbitrary-andcapricious standard. Under that standard, Blue Cross/Blue Shield
contended, the court should uphold as reasonable the administrator's
decision to deny benefits.'
Judge Barry, assuming that the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard was to govern, found that the
'
plan's decision fell "far short and . . . surely was wrong."59

In

deciding that the plan's decision could not even withstand arbitraryand- capricious scrutiny,' Judge Barry stated that "every treatment
that does not have a hundred percent cure rate is open for
improvement and, thus, has somewhat of an investigative or
' Id. at *1. Wilms' tumor is "a rapidly developing cancer of the kidney that
affects esp[ecially] children and is made up of embryonic elements...." WE8sTR'S
MEDICAL DESK DICrIONARY 770 (1986).
"IRollo, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376, at *1. The court's opinion, although it
seemed sympathetic to the plight of a small child who had only a single hope for
life, was most certainly "dispensing compassion instead of justice." See Colen, note
22, at 13.
' Rollo, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376 at *2 (Although it is seemingly obvious that
Blue Cross/Blue Shield would not revel in the death of Tishna Rolo, that was not
the issue before the court. Interestingly, Judge Barry never considered requesting
the hospitals that perform HDCT-ABMT to lower their prices and share the
financial burdens with the insurance companies.).
' Id. at *7.
' Id. at *21-22 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,110-11
(1989)).
9

Id. at *22.

' See id.
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experimental component."'" Judge Barry disregarded the fact that
HDCT-ABMT may well have a cure rate of only 50%, not even
remotely close to the 100% figure that she used in her analogy.62
Although the opinion examined the case under an arbitrary-andcapricious standard of review, the administrator's decision to deny
Tishna Rollo benefits was reviewed, in essence, de novo, and the plan
administrator's decision received no weight.'
Judge Barry's
decision therefore contravened the standard of review established by
the United States Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
n " Even more troubling about the Rollo decision is that Wilms'
Bruch.
tumor is rare and that all the studies relied on by the court had
fewer than twenty-five subjects."
A similar analysis to the one the court used in the Rollo case
was used in Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia,' in which
the federal district court reversed de novo,67 the plan administrator's
denial of benefits for HDCT-ABMT treatment. 6"
The plan
administrator was given express authority to decide which
procedures were "medically necessary" under the plan," but was
not given the same authority with regard to the "experimental"
exclusion; thus the court reviewed de novo7. In concluding that
61Rollo,

1990 Dist. LEXIS 5376 at *26-27 (emphasis added).
62See id. at *7.
' See id. at *21-22 ("Blue Cross/Blue Shield argues that its determination...
must be reviewed - and upheld - under an arbitrary and capricious standard...
. I have no difficulty in finding that Blue Cross/Blue Shield's decision falls far short
and... it surely was wrong.. ").
"489 U.S. 101,115 (1989). The Supreme Court has recognized that the standard
of review often determines the outcome of the case by stating that,
the validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is likely
to turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue.
Consistent with established principles of trust law, we hold that
denial of benefits.., is to be reviewed under a de novo standard
unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan.

Id.
sZweig, supra note 20, at Z6.
741 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D. Va. 1990).
67 See id.

" See id.
19 Id.
70

Id.
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HDCT-ABMT was not experimental, the court gave little weight to
the fact that HDCT-ABMT had not undergone phase III evaluation'"
and that the absence of phase III evaluation, which would have
provided data comparing HDCT-ABMT treatment with a control
group that received a placebo, was "relevant, but neither
determinative nor ultimately persuasive of the treatment's status as
experimental medical practice."' The court further stated that "the
treatment mortality rate is sufficiently low as not to call into question the
treatment's safety."' 3 The court noted that its decision should be
viewed narrowly74 and that it should be read in terms of the expert
testimony and experimental exclusions of different plans on an ad hoc
basis.' The court, however, did not focus on the true issue it was
to decide:76 whether the treatment proposed by the plaintiff was
See Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 591.
Id. at 594 (footnote omitted).

Id. (emphasis added). The court recognized that there was a chance that one
out of every seven patients receiving HDCT-ABMT would die from the HDCTABMT, but since the patient had a better chance for survival with HDCT-ABMT
than without the treatment, the procedure was not experimental. Id. at 593. This
argument is non sequitur and does not consider the facts the court had before it.
See also Eckholm, supra note 7, at A22.
Until recently all patients spent more than a month in the
hospital and transplant-related mortality at some leading centers
was over 20 percent, most often from infections. But the recent
availability of growth factors, manufactured versions of natural
body chemicals that stimulate the marrow cells, has shortened
the period of critical vulnerability, reduced hospital stays to as
little as three weeks and pulled down death rates to 5 [-] 15
percent at various centers.
Id.
7 Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp at 594. The court attempted to legitimize its decision by
stating,
[w]orth noting here is the modest breadth of this decision. It is
not a green light signalling a general expansion of coverage
under group health policies like the Plan. Rather, the decision is
narrowly, but firmly, anchored in the specific expert medical
testimony presented and in the terms and structure of the Plan's
experimental exclusion provision.
Id. The court states that its decision was based on expert medical testimony but
did not acknowledge the expert that testified on the defendant's behalf.
7 See id. at 594 ("Of course, a different experimental exclusion, or different
expert testimony, or a plan that conferred broad discretion on the administrator
might well require a different result.").
7' See Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 594.
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generally accepted by the medical community for the treatment of
breast cancer.' The court professed that "purveyors of quackremedies and fringe therapies should derive no benefit from this
decision. HDCT-ABMT is neither of these."' In reversing the plan
administrator's decision, the court stated that,
Blue Cross' coverage denial decision would probably
have survived under an arbitrary and capricious
standard [but] [b]ecause this issue was not squarely
presented, the Court concludes ... that the issue

would deserve more thorough consideration in the
event this decision is reversed with respect to the
standard of review. There is little doubt, however,
that Blue Cross' position that HDCT-ABMT is
experimental was asserted in good faith and was not
insubstantial. 9
Although the court recognized that the standard of review used
would be outcome determinative,' this statement does little at this
late stage of the game, after the court ruled that the plan did not
convey the authority on the administrator to construe the term
"experimental. 81
Similarly, in Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co.,82 the
court was asked to decide whether HDCT-ABMT was covered by the
experimental exclusion in an ERISA policy for the treatment of
multiple myeloma.' The plan administrator who possessed the
initialadministrative and determination authority was The Prudential
7See id. at 587.

Id. at 594 (the court failed to consider those treatments that, although not
quackery, are not yet perfected to the point that they can no longer be deemed
experimental).

"Id. at 595 n.20.
10 See id.
s See Pirozzi, 741 F. Supp. at 594.
716 F. Supp. 131 (D.N.J. 1989).
See id. at 132; see also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1013 (25th ed. 1990)
(Multiple myeloma is "an uncommon disease that occurs more frequently in men
than in women and is associated with anemia, hemorrhages, recurrent infections,
and weakness ....It] originates in bone marrow and involves chiefly the skeleton
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Insurance Company of America ("Prudential")." Prudential was
given its authority as plan administrator under an administrative
services agreement with the defendant Crum & Forster welfare
plan.'5
The Crum & Forster Medical Plan ("the Plan")"5 incorporated
a procedure by which the Prudential Pre-admission and Concurrent
Review Service ("PACRS"),87 as plan administrator, made
determinations concerning the initial need for benefits.'5 The Plan
contained an experimental exclusion stating that benefits would be
conferred for a treatment if that treatment was "neither educational
nor experimental in nature nor provided primarily for research
purposes."8 9 After an initial determination of need by Prudential
PACRS, it was left to Crum & Forster to make the final decision
whether to grant or withhold benefits.' Plaintiff Dozsa's request
for benefits was denied by Prudential as falling under the
experimental exclusion.9 HDCT-ABMT was a new procedure that
had been denied for all disorders under the Plan until shortly before
Dozsa's request for the treatment. 92 However, several months
before Dozsa requested the treatment Prudential had determined that
HDCT-ABMT would be covered for certain disorders, of which,
multiple myeloma was not one.'
Before denying coverage to
Dozsa, the Plan questioned experts and traveled to hospitals that
perform HDCT-ABMT to determine its effectiveness in the treatment
of multiple myeloma. 9' The Plan then concluded that HDCT-ABMT
was still experimental in the treatment of multiple myeloma.9 The
Plan stated, accordingly, that a procedure would no longer be
deemed investigational "[w]hen. such therapy is backed by a
consensus in peer-reviewed medical literature.""'
In determining
" Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 132.
85
Id.
86 Id. at 132.
87

Id. at 133.

8 Id.

Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 134.
0Id.

8

9

91Id.

Id. at 135.
at 135-36.
'9 Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 135-36.
9Id. at 136.
96 Id. at 138.
92

9Id.
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whether HDCT-ABMT was generally accepted by the medical
profession, however, the court looked, not to the medical profession
as a whole, but to "those administering ABMT treatment."9'
In concluding that Crum & Forster must pay for the HDCTABMT treatment, the court held that Prudential did not apply the
language of the Crum & Forster Plan but rather had inserted a new
exclusion. This new exclusion, in the court's opinion, stated "that no
coverage would be provided for therapy which is 'investigational'
and therapy which is not backed by a consensus in peer reviewed
medical literature is 'investigational' ... [and that this] is clearly not
a basis for exclusion in the Crum and Forster Medical Plan."" The
court stated that payment was mandated under either arbitrary-andcapricious standard or a de novo review.99 It reasoned that the
investigational exclusion in the Plan could not be met by resorting to
peer-reviewed literature. 1' ° The court held that Prudential had
10
created an exclusion not present in the Crum & Forster Plan, '
which excluded only treatments that were not "commonly and
customarily recognized throughout the doctor's profession ''as
appropriate in the treatment of the sickness or injury. 02
Furthermore, the court concluded that although a lack of peer
reviewed medical literature may be evidence of nonrecognition
"Id. at 13 (stating that the court was defining "profession" as indicating those
doctors who actually treat patients with HDCT-ABMT and those doctors who had
extensive knowledge of HDCT-ABMT). The error on the part of the court was to
rely solely on the doctors who actually performed the procedure, see id., and not to
include those doctors who have knowledge of HDCT-ABMT but who consider the
procedure to be experimental for multiple myeloma. Those doctors who actually
perform HDCT-ABMT were sure to state that HDCT-ABMT was not experimental
or investigative for multiple myeloma; the court's definition was therefore
underinclusive. See also Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d
416, 427 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("[T]hese physicians are specialists
in the treatment of fertility and naturally want to encourage the use of an exciting
and promising treatment.") (emphasis added); Puzzanghera, AIDS Ruling, supra
note 4, at 7 ("Research physicians with egos and reputations at stake are unlikely
to admit that a treatment they devised is experimental and that they're not sure it
will work."); Bazell, supra note 5, at 9 ("[TIhe doctors carrying out ABMTs are bone
marrow transplanters, not cancer specialists, and they think they are performing
miracles.").
Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 138.
See id.
100
See id.
"oSee id.
'0

Id. at 134.
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throughout the medical profession, a lack of such literature is not
conclusive."1 a In concluding that HDCT-ABMT was not
experimental,"° the court stated that because HDCT-ABMT "was
simply the only appropriate treatment available to treat the plaintiff's
condition," a fortiori HDCT-ABMT was not experimental.'0
One of the few cases that expressly followed an arbitrary-andcapricious analysis,'" White v. Caterpillar,Inc.,"° involved HDCT-

ABMT in the treatment of breast cancer. The plan in White provided
that the plan administrator "shall have the sole and exclusive right
to determine whether or not such procedure is a generally accepted
surgical operation.""° Surprisingly, the court found that the plan
expressly conferred on the plan administrator the discretion to make
eligibility determinations." ° The plan provided that in determining
a treatment's status, the administrator would use two reports as a
guide: 10 (1) the Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project (the "CEAP")
of the American College of Physicians, and (2) the Diagnostic and
Therapeutic Technology Assessment (the "DATTA") of the American
Medical Association."' Because the CEAP did not refer to HDCT103

See Dozsa, 716 F. Supp. at 138.

104 See

id ("This was to be nothing more than the normal treatment accorded a

patient. It wasn't to be educational, it wasn't to be experimental; it wasn't to be
provided primarily for research purposes. It was simply the only appropriate
treatment available to treat plaintiff's condition.").
106See id.
106 See also Burdette v. Mees, Nos. 90-3108, 90-3118,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15839
(4th Cir. May 23, 1991). The Fourth Circuit recently applied the arbitrary-and capricious standard of review and correctly noted that,
the plan offered the administrator discretionary authority.
Therefore, our review is a deferential one. We must determine
whether the Trustees abused their discretion or acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in denying Burdette benefits. We emphasize
that the scope of this review is narrow; this court is not
empowered to "substitute its own judgment for that of the
agency" when the plan fiduciaries have offered a reasonable
interpretation of a plan's provisions. In this case, however the
district court correctly found that the Trustees acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.
Id. (citations omitted).
107 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
'o

See id. at 1420 (quoting the Group Insurance Benefits Plan).
id.

10See
110

Id.

"I

Id.
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ABMT, the court looked only to the DATTA."'
The court
determined that the DATTA report was ambiguous because a 1985
report found HDCT-ABMT to be investigational in the treatment of
solid tumors such as breast cancer, while a 1990 report found
autologous bone-marrow transplants with high dose chemotherapy
were promising in the treatment of cancer treatment.1 13 In finding
that the plan had failed under even the differential standard of
review, the court stated that,
[i]n an area of ever-developing medical expertise,
defendant steadfastly clung to the results of a fiveyear old study in denying plaintiff coverage. While
the 1990 study should have put defendant on notice
that the efficacy of treating breast cancer with HDCTABMT was at least debatable and that further
examination of the issue by defendant would
therefore be prudent, defendant chose instead to bury
its head in the sand."4
The court again paid lip service to an arbitrary-and-capricious
standard of review, but in effect reviewed the plan administrator's
decision de novo, even after expressly conceding that the issue was "at
least debatable." Thus the court substituted its judgment for that of
those administering the plan contrary to both the statutory and
common law of ERISA." 5
As the preceding cases indicate, "it is standard insurance
contract doctrine that ambiguous policy language should be
construed in favor of the insured wherever reasonable."" 6 When
a plan is written in clear and unambiguous language, however, a
court must give the words their plain meaning and not inject
112
113

See White, 765 F. Supp. at 1420.
Id. at 1421.

Id. at 1421-22.
'is See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989).
114

'16 Continental Casualty Co. v. Cole, 809 F.2d 891, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted) (stating that words or phrases in insurance policy are considered

ambiguous only if fairly susceptible to more than one meaning); see also Arkwright
Boston Mfrs. v. Warsaw Paper Mills Co., 818 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1987).
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ambiguity where is none."' When a policy provides exclusions but
does not define exclusionary terms, such as what constitutes
experimental or investigative treatment, the terms will be construed
against the insurer." 8 However, the Fourth Circuit has followed a
different view. According to that court of appeals, "this deferential
standard of review [the arbitrary-and-capricious standard] applied
even where the core dispute was over the interpretation of the
ambiguous terms of plan documents."' 9 Some courts will also defer
to the plan administrator or fiduciary notwithstanding the term being
construed is ambiguous, 20 thus resulting in the standard set in De
Nobel v. Vitro Corp."' It is evident that many courts will refuse to
apply a de novo standard of review, even though the plan provisions
do not vest the plan administrator or fiduciary with the discretion to
construe the specific terms of the plan per se." 2 However, the cases
refusing to apply a de novo standard were not construing
"1 See Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 873 F.2d 486,489-91 (1st
Cir. 1989); see also Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Porter-Englehart, 867 F.2d 79,
87-88 (1st Cir. 1989). The First Circuit has stated that "[s]o long as contract
language is plain and free from ambiguity, it must be construed in its 'ordinary
and usual sense."' Id. (quoting Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 365 (1st

Cir. 1988)).
o Continental, 809 F.2d at 895.
De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180,1184 (4th Cir 1989) (emphasis added);
see also Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985).
'" Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003,1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Holland
v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985)).
121 885 F.2d at 1184.
Not all courts applying this narrow standard of review were
wholly enamored with it, however, particularly as applied in
cases where there were strong indications of biased or otherwise
malfeasant administrative decision making. Without abandoning
the "arbitrary and capricious" formulation, these courts were
willing to apply it somewhat less deferentially when they
perceived the possibility of bias or conflict of interest on the plan
fiduciary's part. Id. (citing Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 71112 (9th Cir. 1985)). Jung held that there was less deference to be
paid when the employer administers the plan himself or when
the denial of benefits constitutes a large sum of employer funds.
Id.
" See, e.g., De Nobel, 885 F.2d at 1187 n.4. "In several post-Bruch decisions,
reviewing courts have construed plan documents as precluding de novo reviewnotwithstanding that the relevant provisions thereof apparently did not vest in the
defendant administrators or fiduciaries 'discretionary' authority per se." Id. (citing
Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37,39 (11th Cir. 1989)).
'
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experimental exclusions."z Judges apply a harsher standard when
a life-saving treatment is involved.
In response to the recent trend among courts that require
ERISA plans to provide funds for treatments that may not be
accepted by the medical community, the health and welfare trust
fund for workers employed by San Francisco's major unionized
hotels has begun to provide supplemental benefits to employees who
suffer from AIDS and HIV-related illnesses."
This specialized
fund was established during contract negotiations between Hotel and
Restaurant Employees Local 2 and San Francisco's class A hotels in
their 1989 collective bargaining agreement. The fund began to collect
money in November 1990." The main function of the fund is "to
cover expenses not reimbursed through the trust fund's regular
coverage .... [S]ome of the most effective AIDS treatments are

experimental and not covered by the regular plan."" 6 Experts
believe that the Hotel and Restaurant Employees AIDS fund will
influence other employee plans to adopt similar measures. Thus,
insurance providers will no longer deny benefits under exclusionary
provisions and then have the decisions overturned in court." 7
II. HDCT-ABMT IN THE TREATMENT OF ACQUIRED
IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME: THE CASE OF THOMAS BRADLEY'

28

In what was the most publicized case involving a denial of
benefits by an insurance company for HDCT-ABMT treatment," 9
"ZI See, e.g., Gary v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 39
(11th Cir. 1989); Lowry v. Bankers Life & Casualty Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522,
524-25 (5th Cir. 1989); Retirement & Security Program for Employees of Nat'I Rural
Electricians Coop. Ass'n v. Olgethorpe Power Corp. Retirement Income Plan, 712
F. Supp. 223, 226 (D.D.C. 1989).
1 See Union Trust Fund Begins Paying Supplemental Benefits To AIDS Patients,18
Pension Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 423 (1991).
12 See id.
126 Id.
1 See, e.g., id.
This was not an ERISA case; Thomas Bradley had purchased a private
insurance policy. Therefore, the New York State common law of insurance applied.
See Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
" The Bradley case was the most publicized case of an insurance company's
denial of coverage to a beneficiary due to the fact that it concerned a possible
lifesaving treatment for AIDS and also due to the popularity of Tom Bradley. See
Laurie Garrett, A Painfiul Treatment; Bradley's Marrow TransplantAlso Will Be Risky,
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Thomas Bradley was able to persuade the New York State Supreme
Court, New York County, that his insurance policy's exclusion could
not prevent his insurance company from paying for his HDCT-ABMT
treatment."'O Thomas Bradley was a popular school teacher from
Suffolk County who contracted AIDS and requested that he receive
HDCT-ABMT."' The plan to which Bradley subscribed provided
that "Blue Cross will not pay for services which are deemed
experimental or investigative according to guidelines established
jointly for the Empire Plan by the State of New York, Blue Cross and
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company."'3 2 Blue Cross & Blue
Shield responded to public opinion that it was a heartless and did
not care for human life by stating that,
[t]he insurance company also has to be caring about
a lot of other people being insured. And if we pay
$150,000 for every patient with HIV infection, there's
not going to be money to pay for some of the other
things that we ought to be paying for, as well as it
may preclude many subscribers from obtaining
insurance, because the premium will have to escalate
to such an extraordinary level."
In finding that HDCT-ABMT was a treatment available to Bradley
under his policy," the court paid little deference to the fact that,
only five other people have undergone this Hopkins
AIDS procedure. Two died shortly after their
transplants when tumors they had before undergoing
the procedure grew out of control .... Two other
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 21, 1990, at 3.
130See Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
'3' Garrett,supra note
3

129, at 3.
Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 909.

" PrimetimeLive (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 20,1990) (quoting Dr. William
Rial of the Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association) (transcript on file with the New
York Law School Journal of Human Rights); see also Colen, supra note 22 at 11 ("[T]he
idea of providing the procedure as a treatment for even a tiny fraction of the
approximately 1 million HIV-positive individuals is surreal. To say nothing of the
cost: Try multiplying $150,000 times 1,000,000. You, too, will come up with $150
billion.").
" See Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
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men with HIV disease received marrow transplants
quite recently, and it is too soon to tell if the efforts
were successful .... The fifth man had a transplant
four months ago "and analysis with PCR... shows
no sign of HIV in his body."'"
Had the court looked to the medical community's response to the
claim of Dr. Kent Holland, who testified on Thomas Bradley's behalf
at trial, Justice Wilk would have learned that no conclusions could
reasonably be drawn with reference to the fifth patient, the one who
showed no sign of HIV infection following HDCT-ABMT.
Researchers have learned that,
[i]t is not uncommon for researchers using the most
sensitive techniques to detect virus in the body of a
person with AIDS one month, not detect it the next,
and then detect it again. The virus can hide inside
the genetic material of the body's cells and then
reappear. So it is absurd to claim that the body is rid
of the virus simply because one cannot detect it on a
single day."3
More recently, in a government study of sixteen HIV-infected
men, HDCT-ABMT treatment, "[d]espite previous reports indicating
the approach may be encouraging," 13 7 showed "no long-term
benefit for the 16 men."'" The Bradley court, however, reasoned
that coverage was mandated under the policy because,
[tihe testimony made clear that chemotherapy and
bone marrow transplants have a sufficient history to
support the medical community's conclusion that
they are not investigative treatments. This is true
notwithstanding the severe side effects of chemotherapy,
the significantrisk of deathfrom bone marrow transplants

's Garrett, supra note 129, at 3 (quoting Dr. Kent Holland, who was to lead
Bradley's treatment team at Johns Hopkins).
" Robert Bazell, Medicine show; Science & Society-AIDS research advances, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 22, 1990, at 16.
'37Bone Marrow Transplants Failfor AIDS, UPI, Oct. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
138Id.
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and the uncertaintyof the results. The consequences of the
absence of these treatments is more certain. 39
The Bradley court stated that "[t]he combination of
chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant is... accepted by the

medical community and has been used with varying success to treat,
among other things, metastatic breast cancer, leukemia and aplastic
anemia."'"
Although the court expressly recognized both the
potential benefits that Bradley could receive and the significant risks
of the operation itself,' it paid great deference to Dr. Holland,
Bradley's expert witness, who stated that "bone marrow transplant
combination will be just as effective in treating Mr. Bradley's
immunodeficiency as it has been with non-HIV related
problems."''
Bradley's procedure was to involve the drug
azidothymidine ("AZT") to be used as a guard against reinfection by
the AIDS virus."
The court reasoned that because AZT is
generally accepted as a treatment for AIDS,'" its inclusion with
HDCT-ABMT did not make the HDCT-ABMT procedure
experimental. 145 Justice Wilk's opinion in the Bradley case has been
139Bradley, 562

N.Y.S.2d at 908, 909 (Sup. Ct.1990) (emphasis added).

140
See id.

See id. In theory, HDCT-ABMT would be effective for the treatment of
various AIDS related cancers, "[b]ut as a therapy, itself, it seems too expensive,
cumbersome and toxic to become widely useful ....Would you want to wait for
better therapy for AIDS or take the thirty percent chance of dying from the bone
marrow transplant?" Painfiul Treatment, supra note 129, at 3 (quoting Dr. Mark
Jacobson of San Francisco General Hospital AIDS clinic).
142 Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The court confuses the hope of a single doctor
with a proven treatment. What could be more experimental than a treatment that
has never shown any benefit to a patient who has received it?
143 Id. at 909.
1" Seee.g., Gina Kolata, AIDS Drug Trials May Be Revamped, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
8, 1990, at A24 ("[A]zidothymidine, or AZT, is licensed to combat the AIDS virus
141

Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 910. See also Colen, supra note 22, at 13. As one
commentator observed, Justice
Wilk ruled that what was at issue was not whether the treatment
Bradley sought was experimental, but rather whether the
individual components of that treatment were considered
standard treatments for other diseases. Obviously, marrow
transplantation and the other parts of the Hopkins treatment are
standards in combatting a number of diseases. Therefore, said
[Justice] Wilk, it matters not whether they may be useless
145

240
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interpreted as "establish[ing] ... that what matters is what the
standard of care for the individual patient. If all treatments are
experimental, then experimental is the standard of care and
insurance carriers must pay."'" Thus, eliminating experimental
exclusions for diseases that have no generally accepted treatments.
a form "which
The court also noted that Bradley was required to sign
47
emphasizes the research aspect of the procedure.'
Subsequent to Justice Wilk's decision, Thomas Bradley was
admitted to Johns Hopkins Medical Center. After two days of
testing, Bradley's doctors detected CMV retinitis, an eye virus
common among AIDS patients and an ailment that prevents the use
of HDCT-ABMT. 1' Bradley's physicians then determined that the
CMV virus had been in Bradley's system for approximately a
week.4 It was a painful ending to the bitter court struggle for
insurance benefits.
In New York, courts have uniformly held that clear and
unambiguous terms of an insurance policy are clear and
unambiguous must be given their plain and usual meaning; the
agreements must not be rewritten by the court." It is also the law
in New York, however, that any ambiguities in an insurance policy
must be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurance
company.' It is the insurer who bears the burden of proving that
a particular treatment falls within the exclusionary provision of an
against AIDS, they are standard treatments and Blue Cross
should pay for them.

Id. at 13. (The court begs the question on this issue because it was the bone
marrow transplant in itself that Blue Cross argued was experimental, rather than
inclusion of AZT.).
" Jim Puzzanghera, AIDS Patient Awarded Coverage, NEWSDAY (Nassau &
Suffolk ed.), Aug. 1, 1990, at 33 (quoting David Barr, a staff attorney with the Gay
Men's Health Crisis in Manhattan).
" Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 910 (The form Bradley was required to sign should
have alerted the court to the experimental nature of HDCT-ABMT for the treatment
of AIDS.).
" Susan Reed, A Vital Operation Delayed, Time Runs Out For A Beloved Teacher,
TIME, Sept. 10, 1990, at 122.
149Id.
'" See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Annunziata, 492 N.E.2d

1206, 1207 (N.Y. 1986).
's'

1977).

See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Kliger, 366 N.E.2d 865, 866 (N.Y.
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insurance policy. 2 Thus, in Bradley, Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield had the burden of proving that the use of HDCT-ABMT in the
treatment of AIDS fell under the policy's exclusionary provision.
Thus, the Bradley court construed all ambiguous terms construed in
Bradley's favor. The court's opinion, however, fails to mention even
one case involving the substantive interpretation of an insurance
contract's terms, although there are numerous appellate court
decisions in New York involving the interpretation of exclusionary
language in insurance policies."s
Justice Wilk should have looked to the decision of the
Appellate Division, Second Department decision in Zuckerberg v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield"s if he wanted to decide the Bradley case strictly
on public- policy grounds. Zuckerberg, while not binding precedent,
involved a denial of coverage under an experimental exclusion for
nutritional therapy for the treatment of cancer.'1 The Zuckerberg
court concluded that,
the denial of coverage by defendant Blue Cross...
will not discourage the development of legitimate
innovative methods of treating cancer. It will, rather,
have the desirable effect of affording greater
protection to the general public, and, in particular,
cancer patients who are especially vulnerable to
unfounded claims of miraculous cures. Specifically,
our decision will insure that the treatment rendered
on behalf of patients is administered in facilities
comporting with certain minimal standards and that
its effectiveness has been adequately demonstrated by
studies conducted in accordancewith appropriatescientific
methodology before the resources of a major health insurer
See, e.g., Neuwirth v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 465 N.E.2d
353, 354 (N.Y. 1984) ("The burden of proving that a claim falls within the exclusions
of an insurance policy rests with the insurer.").
153 See, e.g., Neuwirth v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 465 N.E.2d
152

353 (N.Y. 1984); Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross &Blue Shield of Greater New York, 487
N.Y.S.2d 595, 600 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1985). (In deciding that nutritional therapy
was not a covered treatment, the appellate division stated that it "ha[d] been unable
to find any documentation establishing that Gerson nutritional therapy is an
effective treatment for cancer using an objective scientific method.").
1 487 N.Y.S.2d 595 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1985).
15 See id. at 597.
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are utilized to support it."
The New York State Supreme Court in Bradley gave great
weight because Bradley's identical twin brother would supply the
bone marrow, reducing the risk of Thomas Bradley's body rejecting

the bone marrow."" Because the court decided this case more
upon sympathy for a man who faced a terminal illness than on the
interpretation of a contractlsm it has created a dangerous
environment for insurance companies. 5 9
III. HDCT UNDER THE MEDICARE PROVISIONS OF THE
SOCIAL SECTJRrY AcT 6'
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act,' 6' commonly known
as Medicare, is administered by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary"). 2 Part A 62 of the Medicare program
provides insurance for health services, including hospital stays and
treatment.'"
Part B of the Medicare program is entitled
"Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for the Aged and
Disabled"'6 and grants supplemental benefits such as outpatient
care. 16 The Medicare program provides benefits to those who are
sixty-five years of age or older or who are disabled, 67 and is

'"'

Id. at 600 (emphasis added).

157
See Bradley, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
'

See id.

The courts have been placed in extremely difficult situations; the "[c]ourts
have found themselves unable to resist that type of emotional argument. If the
identical twin says, 'I want to do this for my brother,' how are you going to not let
him try? I'm no friend of insurance companies, but you can see the decks really
stacked against them when they walk into the courtroom." Puzzanghera, AIDS
Ruling, supra note 4, at 7, 23 (quoting George J. Annas, Professor of Health Law at
Boston University School of Medicine).
'60
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (1988).
161

Id.

162 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).

163 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i(2) (1988).
1" See id.

16'
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395k, 13951, 1395x(s) (1988). Part B of the Medicare program has
been called "a private medical insurance program that is subsidized in major part

by the Federal Government." Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 190 (1982).
1'42 U.S.C. §§ 1395k, 13951, 1395x(s) (1988).
167See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c(1) (1988).
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financed through monthly payments from the beneficiaries and the
federal government.'"
Under the Medicare program, Congress has expressly
excluded payment for all treatment that is "not reasonable and69
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.'
Under this exclusionary language, the Secretary has prohibited the
payment of any funds to cover "any experimental, investigational, or
unproven treatment or diagnostic method not yet generally accepted
in the medical profession.' 7 0
The determination of the
reasonableness or necessity of a particular treatment is often made
"on a case-by-case basis by the carrier.""
The carriers are
insurance companies that administer the payments to beneficiaries
for covered claims" and determine whether a particular treatment
is covered under Medicare.'73
"The carriers make this
determination in strict accordance with the Medicare statute and the
regulations, instructions and guidelines promulgated by the
Secretary.""7 4
When a treatment poses a particularly difficult coverage
problem, the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") makes
a "national coverage determination clearly indicating to the carriers
whether the particular item should be covered or not."'7
The
HFCA,
[iun making its assessment of reasonableness and
necessity[,] . . . often relies on the Public Health
Service (PHS) for an evaluation of the safety and
effectiveness of a particular service and the extent to
42 U.S.C. § 1395t (1988).
16 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(a) (1988).
168 See

10 Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Medicare Part
B Carrier's Manual, Coverage Issues Index); see also Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150,
1156 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added) ("In making such a decision [whether
to provide payment for a particular service], a basic consideration is whether the
service has come to be generally accepted by the professional medical community
as an effective and proven treatment for the condition for which it is being used.
If it is, Medicare may make payment.").
11 Friedrich v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 830 (6th Cir.

1990).
172Id.

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
175 Id. at 830-31 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 405.860 (1980)).
173

174
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which it has been accepted by the medical
community. Within PHS, every review of this kind
is undertaken by the Office of Health Technology
Assessment (OHTA) of the National Center for
Health Services Research and Health Care
Technology Assessment. OHTA usually places a
notice in the Federal Register announcing that an
assessment is underway and soliciting comments
from interested parties. During the assessment
process OHTA also seeks information and
recommendations from governmental agencies such
as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). OHTA also
consults with professional organizations and medical
specialty groups to determine whether the procedure
is generally accepted by the medical community as
being safe and effective, and conducts a review of the
medical literature. HCFA then issues a national
coverage determination based on its consideration of
PHS's recommendations. 176
Under the Medicare system, "the Secretary is not required to
defend it [the national coverage determination] in response to
individual claims by every person who disagrees with the decision
to deny coverage."'"' Each claimant who requests coverage for a
particular treatment will not have the language "reasonable and
necessary" construed as it applies to them after the HCFA has made
Because the Secretary's
a national-coverage determination.' 7
176Friedrich, 894 F.2d. at 831.
'7'

Id. at 838.

17

Id. (holding that Plaintiff "Friedrich does not have a due process right to

have his individual claim considered de novo in the face of the Secretary's
determination."); see also Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1989). The
Second Circuit held that,
the government could not possibly adjudicate on a case-by-case
basis whether a given procedure is "not reasonable and
necessary," the Secretary, in order to execute faithfully the
mandates of the Medicare statute, necessarily must paint with a
broad brush by issuing regulations specifying certain services as
per se not reasonable or necessary, such as those which are
experimental and not yet generally accepted in the medical

community.
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national-coverage determination will not be reviewed de novo,'7 a
coverage denial will be upheld and the claimant will not have a
procedural due process claim against the federal government under
the Fifth Amendment.' °
The United States Supreme Court has held that a claimant
must have a property interest that is "more than a unilateral
expectation" ' and that the claimant must have "a legitimate claim
of entitlement"' 2 before a denial of benefits made on. a national
coverage determination will violate due process.18s A legitimate
claim of entitlement has been interpreted to mean that a person must
have already acquired an interest in specific benefits.'8 "Thus, the
Court has held that a person receiving welfare benefits under
statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them
has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is
safeguarded by procedural due process."'" The Roth Court held
that "due process requires that when a State [or the federal
government] seeks to terminate [a protected] interest .

. .,

it must

afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case' before the termination becomes effective."'" Several
courts of appeals have interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in
Roth. The Sixth Circuit, for example, has interpreted the Supreme
Court's holding in Board of Regents v. Roth 7 by holding that the
"only legitimate claim of entitlement under Medicare is to those
services that are reasonable and necessary. '""s For a legitimate
claim of entitlement to Medicare benefits to arise, a claimant must
Id. at 451.
17 See, e.g., Goodman, 891 F.2d at 451 ("[Tlhe government could not possibly

adjudicate on a case-by-case basis whether a given procedure is 'not reasonable and
necessary'.... ").
"o See, e.g., Friedrich, 894 F.2d at 838 ("The fact that the hearing officer was
bound by the determination did not deny Friedrich process to which he was due.").
1' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
182 Id.

Id. ("To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it.").
184 See id. at 576-77.
188Id. at 576 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
1 Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7 (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)).
1'7Id. at 564.
188Friedrich, 894 F.2d at 838 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (1988)) (The court
stated that "[tihere is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a given medical
183

procedure just because a doctor prescribes it or a patient requests it.").
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show that the treatment sought is reasonable and necessary.'89
Similarly, in Goodman v. Sullivan,"" the plaintiff contended
that the Secretary had impermissibly denied coverage under the
Social Security Act; the plaintiff stated that the Social Security Act
contained "statutory mandates requiring the Secretary to provide
coverage for all medically necessary services. ,," However, the
Second Circuit in Goodman held contrary to the plaintiff's contention,
we are not directed to any provision in the Medicare
statute expressly requiring coverage for all medically
necessary services. Moreover, we do not think that
such coverage is mandated by implication. The
prohibitory language of § 1395y(a)(1)(A), which bars
benefits for services "not reasonable and necessary"
for diagnosis or treatment, is not reasonably
interpreted as an affirmative mandate to extend
coverage to all necessary services. 9 2
The Secretary is not bound to deem a particular treatment as
generally accepted by the medical community even if that particular
treatment has received FDA approval.'
It is apparent that the analysis given to a denial of benefits
under the Medicare statute on a national coverage determination is
189Id.

0 891 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1989).
1' Id. at 450 ("Goodman's first ground of appeal is that because Congress
requires Medicare to cover all medically necessary services, the Secretary may not
deny coverage for experimental or unproven procedures that a physician
determines to be medically necessary.").
" Id. The Second Circuit held that the Social Security Act requires coverage
denials for treatments that are not reasonable or necessary; "[t]he ostensible purpose
of the regulation here is not to stifle technological change, to favor one procedure
over another, or to influence the judgment of medical professionals. Rather, its
purpose is to carry out the statutory mandate of excluding coveragefor services that are
not reasonableor necessary." Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
" Id. Courts will defer to "the construction and application of a statute by the
agency charged with its administration."Id. (emphasis added) (citing Grocery Mfrs. of
Am., Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1001 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820

(1985)).
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treated quite differently from denials in other situations.'"
Medicare places a great deal of authority and discretion on the
Secretary to determine which procedures will be covered and those
which are not "reasonable and necessary." A case denial of benefits
under the Medicare statute will certainly survive greater judicial
scrutiny than denials under New York State insurance law or ERISA.
However, the federal government has recently announced that it will
restructure the way Medicare decides how or whether to pay for new
procedures, drugs, and technology. 9 The decision to restructure
the Medicare Program is the result of criticism that the current
Medicare coverage policy is arbitrary.'" The new policy will also
affect private insurance companies given that "many insurers view
the Medicare program as a 'wise older brother,' it's likely that some
of the new Medicare criteria also could find their way into private
health insurance policies."'197 As part of the restructured Medicare
Program, cost effectiveness will be taken into account by the
Secretary in deciding whether a procedure should be covered.'"
Numerous groups have objected to using cost-effectiveness to judge
clinical merit because "serious barriers to life-saving new technology"
would be created.'
"Some fear this could lead to rationing by
allowing program officials to rule out any new procedure that is very
Compare Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The
Medicare statute does not require coverage for all medically necessary procedures.")
with Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 (Sup. Ct.
1990) ("The consequences of the absence of these treatments is more certain.") and
with Rolo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.J., No. 90-597,1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376,
at *7 (March 22, 1990) ("[Without ABMT with high dose chemotherapy [Plaintiff]
Tishna will almost certainly die within the year ....
").
'ss See Cathy Tokarski, Health Industry Waitingfor FinalRules Revamping Medicare
Coverage Policy, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 28, 1991, at 22.
196Id.

Id. (quoting Dr. Robert Refowitz, Vice President for Medical Services at
Prudential Insurance Company).
198Tokarski, supra note 195, at 22. Experts believe that the new regulation will
help "to improve review procedures under the OASDI, SS, and Medicare programs
by making such procedures more cost effective.", 18 Pen. Rep. (BNA) 817 (May 6,

1991).
" Tokarski, supra note 195, at 22 (quoting a letter from the American Hospital
Association, the American Medical Association, the American Association of
Retired Persons, and the Health Industry Manufacturers Association to Health and
Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan, M.D.).
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costly."' If the courts and legislatures were to allow privately
funded insurance policies to rely on cost effectiveness as a criterion
in denying coverage, many of the recent decisions would inevitably
have been different.2 ' The new regulation is being carefully
analyzed by insurance companies throughout the country.2 2

IV.

THE EFFECTS OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS
ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

The recent state and federal court decisions granting benefits
to patients for treatments that are questionable due to their
experimental status' have led insurance companies to take
action.'
For example, the Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association
has agreed to finance a majority of the costs related to a clinical
study of an experimental breast-cancer treatment. 2° 5 Interestingly,
the procedure to be funded by Blue Cross & Blue Shield is HDCTABMT.2° Blue Cross announced its decision to provide funds, 27
which will amount to at least $10,000,000 during the three-to-fouryear study, "after Blue Cross-Blue Shield... had been sued by more
than a dozen people and consumer groups seeking experimental
Spencer Rich, Organ Transplants: Rationing by Wallet?; Raising Questions of
Fairness, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1991 at Al, A18.
' See, e.g., Burdette v. Mees, Nos. 90-3108, 90-3118, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
15839, *7 (4th Cir. May 23, 1991) (reversing plan administrator's denial of benefits
under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp.
1418, 1421 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (reversing plan administrator's denial of coverage
under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of
Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 594 (E.D. Va. 1990) (reviewing plan administrator's denial of
benefits de novo); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 139 (D.N.J.
1989) (reviewing plan administrator's denial of benefits de novo).
'02 See Tokarski, supra note 195, at 22.
See, e.g., Rollo, No. 90-597, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5376, at *7; Pirozzi,741 F.
Supp. at 594; Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp., at 139; Bradley v.
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
Altman, supra note 6, at Al.
Id. (Blue Cross & Blue Shield's "decision marked the first time a private
health insurer had agreed to pay for studies of experimental medical procedures
or treatments.").
Id. (Blue Cross & Blue Shield stated that "[tihe study of 1,200 women will
evaluate the combination of a risky and still experimental procedure using the
patient's bone marrow and large amounts of cancer-fighting drugs.") (emphasis
added).
W7 Id.
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therapy.... Blue Cross-Blue Shield lost more than half the suits and
had to pay for the treatment."' Although it is not uncommon for
an insurance company to fund small, independent studies, the
collaboration between Blue Cross & Blue Shield and the National
Cancer Institute is unique because of the volume of funds expended
and the prominence of the parties. 2'
Blue Cross & Blue Shields' recent decision to cover
experimental treatments may encourage other health care providers
to follow suit.2 ' Nonetheless, as commendable as Blue Cross &
Blue Shield's actions are,"' what is actually occurring is that the
insurance companies have been forced to pay for treatments that
should have fallen under the exclusionary language of their
policies.212 In effect, the courts have stricken the exclusionary
a Id. at B8 ("The decision comes amid growing pressure on health insurance
carriers to contribute to the costs of evaluating experimental procedures and
treatments for otherwise untreatable fatal conditions."). (Undoubtedly, Blue Cross
& Blue Shield realize that their backs are up against the proverbial wall and that
they may well save money in the long run by agreeing to fund clinical trials and
not spend enormous amounts of money litigating what is proving to be a lost
cause.). See Bazell, supra note 5, at 9 (Experts suggest that "[b]ecause Blue Cross
and Blue Shield were losing so many cases, they recently offered to finance clinical
trials to determine whether ABMTs work.").
2M B.D. Colen, Insurer,Cancer Institute Join to Fund Trial Therapy, NEWSDAY (City
ed.) Nov. 3, 1990, at 15.
210 Id.
21

See Three Winning Projects, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Financial

Services ed.), Dec. 10, 1990, at 10 [hereinafter Three Projects) ("[Tlhe Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association is winning much deserved praise for an innovative offer
to support research on an experimental treatment for breast cancer.").
212 See id. The decision by Blue Cross & Blue Shield has received much
I
deserved praise,
[iun what has been described as the first venture of its kind, Blue
Cross-Blue Shield will contribute $15 million to a National
Cancer Institute study of the treatment [HDCT-ABMTJ ....
That's terrific news for two reasons. First, it emphasizes the
industry's commitment to finding a constructive solution to the
health care crisis. And second, it confronts the extraordinary
complex issue of experimental treatment in a most positive way.
... It also raises a challenging question: should the industry help
fund similar studies of other experimental treatments to
determine whether they should be used on patients - and,
ultimately, covered by insurance?
Id. If courts continue to reverse benefit denials, insurance companies will inevitably
cease to participate in experimental studies.
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clauses out of insurance policies.213 However, experts suggest that
insurance companies should pay "only for studies by the National
Cancer Institute or similar research organizations and not for
hospitals that undertake studies of their own."214
Although
insurance companies will have some leverage as to which studies
they will fund,2 1 there is little solace in that leverage because a
denial of benefits to a beneficiary of a policy will probably be
reversed by a court. Throughout the analysis of a benefit-coverage
determination, substantial weight must be accorded to the fiduciary
duties that insurance companies owe to their policy holders in order
to ensure that non-effective treatments are not funded.216
Notwithstanding Blue Cross & Blue Shields' decision to aid
in the discovery of new life-saving treatments, the New Jersey
legislature has introduced a bill that would require insurance policies
to state that HDCT-ABMT will be funded under their policies. The
proposed legislation provides that,
[e]very group health insurance policy providing
hospital or medical expense benefits shall provide
benefits to any named insured or other person
covered thereunder for expenses incurred in the
treatment of Wilm's tumor, including autologous
bone marrow transplants when standard
21
2'

See Altman, supra note 6, at Al.
Id. at B8.

" See Clements, supra note 1, at 9. A middle-ground approach that considers
both the rights of the beneficiaries of insurance policies and the insurance

companies themselves is the proposal offered by the Health Insurance Association
of America ("HIAA"). HIAA has formulated guidelines that are more flexible than
the approach taken by Blue Cross & Blue Shield. For example HIAA has suggested
that:
1. Insurer should only be obligated to pay for hospital costs for
experimental treatment in certain defined situations.
2. If a particular patient is being admitted to a hospital solely to

have an experimental treatment administered, then the insurer
should not be obligated to cover the cost.
3. Before any experimental programs are funded by insurance
companies HIAA suggests that the illness be life threatening;
there should be no other treatment alternative; and the particular
experimental treatment should have some proven effect in the
treatment of that illness.
Id.
216

Id.
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chemotherapy
treatment is unsuccessful,
notwithstanding that any such treatment may be
deemed experimental or investigational.
These
benefits shall be provided to the same
extent
as for
21 7
any other sickness under the policy.

This prophylactic rule created by the New Jersey legislature will not
only stifle insurance company funding of new innovative techniques,
but will also force companies to protect themselves from economic
ruin.
Furthermore, if the New Jersey legislation, as written, is to
apply to employee plans governed by ERISA, the legislation may be
struck as an unconstitutional exercise of state authority under the
Supremacy Clause. 8
ERISA contains federal pre-emption
language that has been given the broadest possible meaning by the
courts." 9 ERISA's pre-emption provision states that,
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the provisions of this chapter shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan described in
section 1003(a) of this title .... 2
The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to include all state
laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans; "[a] law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or a reference to such a plan."'" The Court has
held that ERISA pre-emption is so broad that "a state law may 'relate
217 1990 N.J. Laws 71.
218 See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which

shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
. . ."); see also Malone v. White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)
(holding that because of the mandate of the Supremacy Clause, state law must not
conflict or interfere with federal legislation; should a conflict arise, the federal law,
assuming that Congress has manifested the intent to occupy the field, will prevail
by preempting the state provision).

of the Land.

29 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483 (1990); FMC v.
Holiday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409 (1990); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
m Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
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to' a benefit plan, and thereby be pre-empted, even if the law is not
specifically designed to affect such plans or the effect is only
indirect."'
Pre-emption is also not precluded even if state
legislation is consistent with ERISA's substantive goals.'
There
are limits, however, to the breadth of ERISA's preemption clause. A
state law will be pre-empted by ERISA only when it requires the
establishment or maintenance of an ongoing plan. 4
To illustrate the process of ERISA pre-emption, one may look
to the New Jersey case of New Jersey Bus. & Indus. Ass'n v. State.'
In 1990, the New Jersey legislature passed the Family Leave Act (the
"FLA"). 6 The FLA was passed to provide temporary leave from
employment to those employees who acquired newly-born or
adopted children or with family members suffering from a serious
health condition. 7 To implement these goals, the FLA required
employers in New Jersey to provide up to twelve weeks leave for
covered employees.' Section 8(a) of the FLA provides that,
[d]uring a leave taken under section 4 of this act, the
employer shall maintain coverage under any group
health insurance policy.., at the level and under the
conditions coverage would have been provided if the
employee had continued in employment continuously
from the date the employee commenced the leave to
the date the employee returns to work .... 229
Thus, the FLA required employers to continue employee health
benefits during a period of leave, an action that is not mandated
under ERISA. ° Thus, the New Jersey Superior Court found that
the FLA forced multi-state employers to adopt special programs in
New Jersey and that these requirements overburdened
m McClendon, 111 S. Ct. at 483.
22 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
-4 Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12.

" 592 A.2d 660 (N.J. Super. 1991).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11B-1 to § 34:11B-16 (West 1990).

22

See id. § 34:11B-2.
See id. § 34:11B-4.
Id. § 34:11B-8(a).
New Jersey Bus. & Indus. Ass'n. v. State, 592 A.2d 660, 662-63 (N.J. Super.

1991).
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employers.23 Section 8(a) of the FLA was therefore struck from the
statute as an unconstitutional exercise of state authority in violation
of the Supremacy Clause.232 The court permanently enjoined the
State Attorney General and the Director of the Division of Civil
Rights from enforcing section 8(a).233
In the event that the New Jersey legislature passes its HDCTABMT bill and tries to apply it to plans governed by ERISA, the
legislation may well suffer the same fate as the FLA. The HDCTABMT bill would surely "relate to" employee benefit plans and
would also require the maintenance of an ongoing plan.'3 This
result would occur because ERISA plans would be required to fund
HDCT-ABMT, this requirement would occur without reference to the
language of the plan document or to the collective bargaining
agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is evident that insurance companies will be required to bear
their share of the costs as new and promising treatments emerge.
However, a prophylactic rule that forces insurance companies to pay
for treatments on the basis of necessity will effectively cripple their
ability to dictate the terms of their policies, but allow broad national
exclusions under the Medicare system. Inasmuch as insurance
companies seem to be prepared to take an active role' in helping
to alleviate the increasing costs of medical care, they should not have
their policies rewritten by a court's sharp pencil. There are
detrimental effects to courts requiring payment for experimental
treatments,
[w]hen courts overturn reasonable coverage denials
z~' See id.
232See id.
'

See id.

See 1990 N.J. Laws 71; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483
(1990); New Jersey Business & Indus. Ass'n, 592 A.2d at 664.
' See Three Projects,supra note 211, at 10; see also World News Tonight With Peter
Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1990) (transcript on file with the New
York Law School Journal of Human Rights) ("Cancer experts praise Blue Cross for
'i

looking at more than the bottom line."); see also Eckholm, supra note 7, at A22 ("In

the case of marrow transplants, insurance companies have said that if studies yield
proof of benefit, they will cover the procedure whatever it costs.").
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they may interfere with the provision of affordable
insurance products and may act contrary to the
public policy against the use of unproven medical
treatments. Coverage limits provide for affordable
insurance products, and allow insurers to exclude
coverage of truly experimental treatments is
justifiable and desirable .... Insurers have a
legitimate interest in screening the constant stream of
new technologies. They must do so in order to
allocate financial resources prudently. If expensive
new treatments are ineffective, their use drains funds
unnecessarily from the insurance pool.'
This policy concern has often been disregarded by the courts, who
have only looked to the short term effect of coverage denial.
Recently, one insurance company, Petersen International
Insurance Brokers, became the first company to offer HIV/AIDS
insurance.37 Beneficiaries of the insurance program, upon a
positive result from an HIV test, are given a lump sum equal to twohundred and fifty percent of their yearly salary.'
Petersen
emphatically stated that "[t]he payout comes without strings. The
beneficiary can use the proceeds to pay for AZT or some other
treatment, or he could take a world cruise." 9 However, this new
type of insurance is currently available only to groups of five or
more, and the groups must consist of policemen, fire fighters,
physicians, nurses, health-care-facility personnel, or emergency
medical systems personnel.24° Petersen believes that the policies
Belk, supra note 3, at 824.
Insurance Company Offers AIDS Coverage, 12 L.A. Bus. J. No. 31, July 30,1990,
at 7.
2M

id.
HIV is the virus that causes AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome). A positive test result indicates that a person has
developed antibodies to the AIDS virus. Someone diagnosed as
HIV-positive may show no symptoms of the disease for years,
although some health experts have predicted that eventually
everyone who is HIV positive will eventually develop full-blown
AIDS or ARC, AIDS Related Complex.

Id.
239 Id.

240Id.
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will eventually be offered to other groups and individuals.
Groups of fewer than twenty people are required to take an AIDS
test to establish that each member is HIV-negative at the time the
AIDS policy is purchased.'24 For a person who earns a fiftythousand-dollar yearly salary, the minimum insurance premium
would be one-thousand-two-hundred and fifty dollars yearly.'
This new type of insurance, along with the Blue Cross &Blue
Shield Association's decision to fund experimental breast cancer
treatment, are good indicators of the insurance industry's
commitment to finding ways of providing the best possible health
care for their beneficiaries in the most cost-effective manner. We
must allow the insurance industry discretion, nevertheless, to
internalize the rapidly increasing costs of medical treatment. On the
other hand, we must not allow courts to strike experimental
exclusions based on public policy concerns. If the recent trend
among courts that strike exclusions continues, insurance companies
will be forced to protect their own interests by refusing to finance
research for experimental lifesaving procedures and by charging
more for insurance policies. Undeniably, this would leave many
lower-and middle-income families without medical insurance of any
kind. This would be an unfortunate result that is preventable.
Courts should concern themselves with the future beneficiaries who
will require funds for treatments that have been proven safe and
effective.

Perry C. Papantonis
241

Id.

24

Insurance Company Offers AIDS Coverage, 12 L.A. Bus. J. No. 31, July 30,1990,

at 7.
243Id. ("The insurance will cost companies 1 percent to 3 percent of the benefit
amount per year. If an employee earns $50,000, the potential benefits are $125,000,
so the minimum premium would be $1,250.").

